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HOW LAWYERS MANAGE INTRAGROUP DISSENT 
SCOTT L. CUMMINGS*
INTRODUCTION
The title of my talk is How Lawyers Manage Intragroup Dissent. Its 
content is focused on a recurrent and at times seemingly intractable prob-
lem facing lawyers seeking to advance social change: the problem of how 
to gauge and respond to dissenting views within affected communities—
both about the goals of social change efforts and about the means of pursu-
ing them. In exploring this theme, I focus on a subset of lawyers—public 
interest lawyers—whose engagement with intragroup dissent is a defining 
feature of their legal work, which ultimately is judged based on how well 
their advocacy advances the aims of the community members they purport 
to represent. Indeed, it is precisely because the communities on whose be-
half public interest lawyers work are already politically marginalized that 
those lawyers must vigorously guard against silencing dissent within 
them—and thus reinforcing the very exclusion they seek to contest. 
I was motivated to explore this issue with you today by the opportuni-
ty this conference afforded to consider the role of dissent against the back-
drop of the increasing scholarly interest in law and social movements. 
Research on this topic has grown from its roots in social science—dating 
back over thirty years to Joel Handler’s seminal book, Social Movements 
and the Legal System1— to its current robust form, in which it has achieved 
* This keynote speech was delivered at the Chicago-Kent Law Review’s 2013 symposium on “In-
tragroup Dissent.” The speech is based on my writings in Scott L. Cummings, The Accountability Problem 
in Public Interest Practice: Old Paradigms and New Directions, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION 
MAKING IN CONTEXT 340 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); Scott L. Cummings & Douglas 
NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010); and Scott L. Cummings, Law in 
the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927 
(2007). I was incredibly honored to speak at the symposium and deeply humbled, since it contained so 
many participants whose works have profoundly influenced me. I am also incredibly grateful to Holn-
ing Lau for inviting me, and to Rebecca Sundin for her extraordinary efforts in putting together such a 
wonderful and stimulating day. 
1.  JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
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an eminent place as part of mainstream scholarly conversations about con-
stitutional law, legal history, the legal profession, and other fields.2
A key insight of this research is the inevitability of dissent in efforts to 
change the status quo. In a prominent and aptly titled example, Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin’s Bancroft Prize-winning book on the civil rights movement, 
Courage to Dissent,3 examines the role of movement lawyers in Atlanta 
who, long before Derrick Bell’s classic critique,4 challenged the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) national school desegregation strategy by 
bringing omnibus civil rights cases designed to support local direct action.5
Brown-Nagin’s argument is that local lawyers who rejected LDF’s top-
down litigation style and emphasis on racial balance helped the movement, 
by gaining significant leverage over city politics that promoted desegrega-
tion in other social spheres and helped build the power of the black middle-
class in Atlanta.6 She thus draws positive lessons about dissent for lawyers, 
concluding that, “Movements should listen to dissenters and should be 
transformed by thoughtful critiques, particularly those derived from on-the-
ground experiences.”7
As this conclusion suggests, the concept of dissent is deeply linked to 
the legitimacy of lawyers’ efforts to mobilize law for social change. When 
public interest lawyers are seen as inadequately addressing intragroup dis-
sent, their efforts tend to be viewed—both by allies and adversaries—as 
legally and politically suspect. Allies sympathetic to a lawyer’s cause may 
point to the existence of intragroup dissent to challenge and redirect 
movement strategy, as the Atlanta lawyers Brown-Nagin examines sought 
to do in their critique of LDF’s school integration litigation.8 Likewise, 
adversaries hostile to a lawyer’s cause may invoke dissent as a tactic to 
thwart a movement challenge altogether, as happens in the context of de-
fendants’ resistance to class action certification.9
 2.  For recent examples of such scholarship, see, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyer-
ing: Community Economic Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 302, 326-27 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); Douglas NeJaime, The 
Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012). 
 3.  TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
 4.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
 5.  See generally, BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 3. 
 6.  Id. at 431-41. 
 7.  Id. at 440. 
 8.  Id. at 431-41. 
 9.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555-57 (2011) (denying class certification 
in an employment discrimination lawsuit). 
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The challenge, as social movement history teaches, is that some dis-
sent must be sacrificed for collective action to occur and have an impact. 
No communities are monolithic and those that lack power have to guard 
against internal fragmentation as well as external domination. In this way, 
how intragroup dissent is understood and managed within movements be-
comes an important terrain upon which the struggle for social change plays 
out and is ultimately judged. 
It is onto that terrain that my talk tentatively steps by asking how this 
new research—and the practice upon which it is based—should inform our 
view of the contemporary public interest lawyer’s role in social move-
ments. Generally, scholars have viewed lawyers as special threats to 
movements precisely because of the power they can wield to marginalize or 
even ignore dissent in the pursuit of goals that they define.10 This is a real 
and significant risk. But there is another—often less remarked upon—risk, 
which is that lawyering for movements is itself marginalized in the name of 
romanticized democratic grassroots alternatives that may not in fact exist. 
This risk is a significant one in political contexts in which movement ad-
versaries turn consistently and effectively to law and courts to pursue their 
ends. If movements for the less powerful are reluctant to turn to law on the 
grounds that lawyers may divert movement goals or produce unintended 
negative consequences, they may widen the space in which their adver-
saries can set the agenda. For this reason, critics of lawyers ought to be 
confident that their concerns are warranted. 
My talk proceeds against this backdrop. It begins by describing how a 
particular version of public interest lawyering—that associated with the 
“top-down” impact litigation campaign—has come to be viewed as a threat 
to dissent within social movements, and it then turns to explore how an 
alternative version—one which resonates with “bottom-up” visions of so-
cial change—has been proposed as a potential alternative more consistent 
with democratic norms. I suggest that commentary on both versions simpli-
fies what is in practice a complex set of movement dynamics in which law-
yers are continuously negotiating their relationship to dissent—sometimes 
productively, sometimes not. My point is that how, and how well, public 
interest lawyers manage dissent may be less a function of their relative 
location within movements—at the top or bottom—and more one of how 
thickly the field is developed with other types of movement actors and how 
lawyers choose to engage with them. Drawing upon cases from the Cali-
fornia LGBT and labor movements, I suggest that there are contexts in 
 10.  For a classic account of such dynamics, see generally Bell, supra note 4 (discussing lawyers 
at the NAACP-LDF). 
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which top-down lawyering may be quite responsive to dissent and may 
help to prevent dissent form undermining movement goals. Conversely, I 
suggest that lawyer deference to community organizing at the grassroots 
level may reinforce power dynamics embedded in the underlying commu-
nity politics that may risk marginalizing dissenting views. In each case, my 
goal is to explore the complexity and challenge of managing dissent in 
social movements, and also, hopefully, to illuminate new paths forward. 
I. THE DILEMMA OF DOUBLE REPRESENTATION
Let me begin by exploring in a bit more depth the relation of in-
tragroup dissent to public interest lawyering. For public interest lawyers, 
the challenge of managing intragroup dissent stems from the dilemma of 
double representation, or what David Luban famously called the “‘double 
agent problem.’”11 For lawyers generally, the idea of “representation” re-
fers to acting on behalf of one’s client, and is thus associated with strong 
duties of loyalty and competence that run exclusively to the client. 
Public interest law both depends on and challenges this traditional no-
tion of representation. Public interest lawyers do represent clients in the 
traditional sense. But they also do more than that. In the classic formulation 
by Gordon Harrison and Sanford Jaffe, the program officers at the Ford 
Foundation who in the 1970s helped launch the field, public interest law 
involves the “representation of the underrepresented in American socie-
ty.”12 This definition has always had two dimensions. One is market-based 
and consistent with traditional notions of client loyalty; as the Council for 
Public Interest Law in its famous 1976 report put it, public interest law is 
supposed to provide lawyers to those without access to them, “in recogni-
tion that the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such 
services to significant segments of the population and to significant inter-
ests.”13 Once “those without access” to lawyers get them, traditional ideas 
of loyalty attach, and through this redistribution of legal services, the ad-
versarial system is presumed to function more effectively and fairly. 
Yet representation through public interest law has also been associated 
with legal efforts that go beyond merely providing access to lawyers. The 
use of test case litigation to challenge and ultimately change unjust laws—
 11.  DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 319 (1988). 
 12.  Gordon Harrison & Sanford M. Jaffe, Public Interest Law Firms: New Voices for New Con-
stituencies, 58 A.B.A. J. 459, 459 (1972). 
 13.  COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976). 
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pioneered by LDF in Brown v. Board of Education14—rests upon an idea of 
representation that relates directly to the quality and fairness of political 
decision-making. For groups that lack meaningful political power in the 
policy-making arena—because of small numbers, systemic oppression, or 
the absence of mechanisms for collective action—public interest law may 
serve as a substitute for conventional politics. This substitute leverages the 
courts as a counter-majoritarian institution and asserts individual rights as a 
bulwark against the “tyranny of the majority.”15 The goal of deploying law 
in this way is to enhance pluralism, correcting the bias of the democratic 
system.16 This element of public interest law resonates with the famous 
footnote four of U.S. v. Carolene Products, which justified searching judi-
cial review to counteract “prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties.”17
Seeking to advance the interests of “discrete and insular minorities,”18
however, also magnifies the dilemma of double representation that has 
confronted public interest lawyers throughout the movement’s history. The 
dilemma is that in attempting to represent the interests of both client and 
community, the lawyer will do neither well. Focusing on the community’s 
interests may compromise client loyalty; remaining loyal to clients may 
disserve the broader community. That is the tension captured in Austin 
Sarat and Stuart Scheingold’s concept of “cause lawyers”—those commit-
ted not just to serving clients, but also to advancing a moral, political, or 
social cause that transcends their interests.19 It is, of course, possible that a 
client’s interests perfectly match those of the community she represents; 
but in the real world, there are often, even inevitably, differences. 
Critics of top-down lawyering focus squarely on these differences. 
The political critique of public interest lawyers is that they anoint them-
selves leaders and advance a self-defined policy agenda, contrary to the 
rules of democratic politics. There are other critiques—for example—
focused on how litigation, in particular, forces lawyers to minimize dissent 
in order to fit complex group experiences into singular legal arguments 
cognizable by courts. Summarizing this view, Orly Lobel writes that 
 14.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 15.  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the tyranny of the major-
ity). 
 16.  For an elaboration on this point, see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). See also Holning Lau, Identity Scripts & Democratic Delib-
eration, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 930-39 (2010) (elaborating on Ely’s theory of rights protections). 
 17.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 18.  Id.
 19.  STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 9 (2004). 
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“[g]roups are faced with the dilemma of defining mutual goals and assum-
ing a ‘coherentist’ viewpoint in a reality of multiple experiences and voic-
es, which inevitably leads to intragroup exclusion.”20
The turn to bottom-up approaches to lawyering—in which lawyers 
help to form or represent preexisting grassroots groups seeking to build 
local power—tend to be presented as alternatives more likely to represent 
the full range of group interests—and thus less likely to stifle dissent. As 
the quote from Brown-Nagin earlier suggests, anchoring legal work in 
strong grassroots organizations may counteract the tendency of top-down 
lawyers to define their own class in order to advance an abstract principle 
divorced from the lived reality of affected people—the counterweight to 
the view often ascribed to former ACLU director Melvin Wulf who was 
once quoted as saying: “Our real client is the Bill of Rights.”21 Grassroots 
lawyers might respond that their real client is building community power. 
How should we assess these claims? As Bill Rubenstein has usefully 
pointed out, dissent within movements occurs at two levels.22 First, there 
are fundamental normative conflicts about movement goals. Should, for 
instance, the LGBT rights movement pursue marriage or non-marital 
recognition? Should African Americans in the Jim Crow South pursue de-
segregated schools or equal funding for segregated schools? Second, once 
the movement goal has been identified, there is disagreement over the best 
means to achieve it. These disagreements may be about threshold choices, 
such as whether to pursue change through legal or political channels. This 
type of disagreement may be informed by predictions about the likelihood 
of backlash. Indeed, a key point of historical debate about the wisdom of 
Roe v. Wade23 centers on whether going to the Supreme Court undermined 
what would have been potentially more productive state-level political 
efforts to expand access to abortion.24
Even if law is chosen as a preferred strategy to pursue movement 
goals because politics are blocked, there may be disagreements over case 
selection and strategy. Thurgood Marshall was reportedly furious when 
George Vaughn, a small-time St. Louis lawyer who Marshall viewed as an 
inferior talent with a problematic case, beat the NAACP LDF to the punch 
 20.  Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Trans-
formative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 951 (2007). 
 21.  Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1092 (1970) (quoting 
Melvin Wulf). 
 22.  William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members 
and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1633 (1997). 
 23.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 24.  See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 173-79 (2d ed. 2008). 
2014] INTRAGROUP DISSENT AMONG LAWYERS 553 
by filing the suit that led to the Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kra-
mer.25 Finally, even if the so-called “right case” is pursued, disagreements 
may emerge over how to resolve it. As Deborah Rhode notes, classes may 
have consistent views about the wrongs suffered at the outset of a case, but 
fragment when hard choices have to be made about how to best remedy 
those wrongs.26 The classic articulation of the view was made by Derrick 
Bell in his famous broadside against NAACP LDF lawyers litigating sec-
ond-wave desegregation efforts, mostly outside of the deep South, which 
he charged were guided by the lawyers’ unwavering commitment to inte-
gration—read as racial balance—despite a “shift of black parental priori-
ties” toward promoting educational improvement.27 Martha Davis noted a 
similar problem in her account of the welfare rights movement, in which 
she quotes Lee Albert, who took over the Center on Social Welfare Policy 
and Law from founder Ed Sparer in 1967.28 Albert’s view was this: “I be-
lieved in using lawyer’s expertise to provide a leadership role in the 
movement of cases through higher courts.”29
II. MANAGING DISSENT FROM THE TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP
As this suggests, the major criticisms of top-down lawyering are di-
rectly connected to fundamental concerns about intragroup dissent, which 
may be threatened by public interest lawyers filing and pursuing cases that 
short-circuit debate over movement goals and contravene or misguide 
movement strategy. There is strong, though not uniform, evidence that 
some lawyers during the civil rights period—buoyed by the heady example 
of Brown, Ford Foundation funding, and receptive signals from the Warren 
Court—became entranced by what Stuart Scheingold famously called the 
“myth of rights” and over-invested in court strategies that inevitably disap-
pointed.30 Yet there is also evidence that the current generation of public 
interest lawyers have, at least to some degree, learned from past mistakes. 
Recent studies of public interest lawyers—even those at nationally promi-
nent impact organizations—suggest that they litigate less frequently than 
 25.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that racially restrictive covenants were un-
constitutional).
 26.  Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1186-91 (1982) 
(providing a “taxonomy of conflicts” that arise within classes). 
 27.  See Bell, supra note 4, at 514-16. 
28.  MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-
1973 74 (1993).
 29.  Id. (quoting Lee Albert). 
 30.  See Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political 
Change 13-79 (2d ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (1974). 
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their counterparts did thirty years ago, with one survey finding that lawyers 
from prominent organizations generally believe that it is “impossible to 
‘create policy,’ ‘change attitudes,’ or ‘build a movement’ solely through 
litigation.”31 How do these lawyers manage dissent within complex con-
temporary social change movements? 
I want to respond to this question by looking carefully at two recent 
nationally prominent legal campaigns—one from the top-down and one 
from the bottom-up. 
A. Law Reform from the Top-Down: Marriage Equality 
The top-down case comes from the movement for same-sex marriage 
in California—and draws on research I did with Doug NeJaime at UC Ir-
vine.32 You are all no doubt familiar with the recent decision in Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, in which the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by 
marriage opponents of a trial court decision, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 
striking down the California initiative banning same-sex marriage—known 
as Proposition 8—on 14th Amendment grounds.33 The effect of that deci-
sion has been to permit same-sex marriages in California and has been 
rightly praised for doing so. Some of you may be less aware of the litiga-
tion dynamics that produced the case, and I want to recount some of them 
here, precisely because they provide a fascinating window into movement 
lawyers’ response to dissent over the pursuit of marriage as an end goal and 
the use of litigation to get there. 
Much like the paradigmatic civil rights legal campaign, the California 
marriage equality case was characterized by a stable team of movement 
lawyers involved in the long-term planning and execution of strategy. 
These lawyers were affiliated with the key LGBT legal organizations—
Lambda Legal, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the ACLU’s 
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project—and combined elite academic credentials 
with deep experience in the LGBT rights movement. Also like its civil 
rights counterpart, the marriage campaign was marked by deep divisions 
over the ultimate policy objective and how best to achieve it; as well as 
vigorous contests over appropriate strategy and, in particular, the question 
of whether and when to file a lawsuit challenging the denial of marriage 
 31.  Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 
2043 (2008).
 32.  Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1235 (2010). 
 33.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
2014] INTRAGROUP DISSENT AMONG LAWYERS 555 
rights. Yet how movement lawyers managed these challenges looked a lot 
different.
First, the debate over whether to pursue marriage as a movement goal 
was dynamic; movement lawyers did not assert marriage as a goal and then 
mobilize in its pursuit. Rather, the increasing salience of marriage grew out 
of complex intra-movement processes and was also fueled by strenuous 
counter-movement opposition. 
From the beginning, the question of who got to decide whether mar-
riage should be the central movement goal was deeply contested—and, of 
course, still is. In a well-known exchange in the late 1980s, Lambda Le-
gal’s executive director, Tom Stoddard, and legal director, Paula Ettelbrick, 
debated the merits of the marriage question in a series of articles in a prom-
inent LGBT publication.34
The debate around the first domestic partnership legislation in Cali-
fornia in the late 1990s—a registry bill known as AB 26—reflected the two 
poles of this disagreement.35 One side viewed domestic partnership as a 
way to move the legal status of same-sex couples incrementally closer to 
marriage, eventually setting the stage for marriage equality. The second, 
expressed by some lawyers within Lambda and the ACLU, viewed domes-
tic partnership as a true alternative to marriage. In their view, the goal was 
“to have a world in which marriage would be open to everyone, and some-
thing that provided a less highly defined but still significant safety net—
like domestic partnership—would also be available to everyone.”36
This view, however, gradually lost sway as the focus on marriage as 
the ultimate goal became ascendant within the LGBT rights community. 
Yet one reason for this was the vigor with which opponents of marriage 
equality pursued their agenda—which had the effect of heightening the 
political significance of marriage within movement circles and drawing 
more resources to its defense. In 2000, marriage equality opponents suc-
ceeded in the passage of a statewide law prohibiting California from recog-
nizing marriage by same-sex couples. This provoked LGBT community 
dissatisfaction with the absence of a strong pro-marriage political group 
and thus sparked the development of Equality California as the public edu-
 34.  See Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, Fall 
1989, at 9, reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 398-401 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 
1993); Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 14, 
reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401-05 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993). 
 35.  See Act of Oct. 2, 1999, ch. 588, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3372 (West) (codified as amended at 
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004)). 
 36.  See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1258 (quoting Matt Coles, Director, ACLU 
LGBT Rights Project). 
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cation and legislative advocacy arm of the marriage equality movement. 
The emergence of a powerful pro-marriage political organization began to 
focus the movement’s agenda more directly on marriage equality as a prin-
cipal objective. Toward this end, Equality California spearheaded the drive 
for comprehensive domestic partner benefits—not simply as a goal in its 
own right but as a “stepping stone” for moving incrementally closer to 
marriage. 
Over time, calls for marriage became more univocal, but this occurred 
against the backdrop of complex political dynamics. Within movement 
circles, a key development was the success of marriage proponents in push-
ing their agenda in the face of broader disagreement about alternative fami-
ly structures. In the view of one lawyer from the ACLU, while the 
“leadership was divided” about whether to pursue marriage to the exclusion 
of other statuses, “there was a deeply motivated minority who wanted mar-
riage, and so their view became the more important view.”37 This view 
gained strength as philanthropic foundations began directing increasing 
resources for marriage-related advocacy and there was a broad sense that 
the majority of gay and lesbian couples wanted it. In California, a key mo-
ment came with the passage of a comprehensive domestic partnership law 
in 2003, which incorporated legislative findings designed to “set up suspect 
class arguments” in an eventual marriage case.38 Domestic partnership had, 
in this sense, become a stepping-stone. Yet for those who were uneasy with 
giving priority to marriage, the merger of domestic partnership and mar-
riage was less a strategic innovation than a cause for concern. From this 
point of view, domestic partnership “was hijacked by marriage folks.”39
Even so, the point is that the focus on the right to marry for same-sex cou-
ples was simply not imposed by lawyers from above, but rather evolved 
from within the movement in a complex and dynamic way. 
Control of the tactical agenda was similarly contested throughout the 
marriage equality movement—but in ways that were the reverse of the 
classic test-case paradigm and ultimately showed the limits of movement 
lawyer control. Unlike the LDF lawyers in Brown, LGBT rights lawyers 
did not drive litigation efforts around same-sex marriage—and, in fact, 
actively sought to avoid litigation; however, once litigation was com-
menced, they became involved out of necessity and deployed a range of 
tools to shape the results. 
 37.  Id. at 1306 (quoting Matt Coles, Director, ACLU LGBT Rights Project). 
 38.  Id. (quoting Geoff Kors, Executive Director, Equality California). 
 39.  Id. (quoting Matt Coles, Director, ACLU LGBT Rights Project). 
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After the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick up-
holding state sodomy laws,40 movement lawyers reached a consensus in the 
late 1990s that the marriage campaign had to proceed state by state. They 
concluded, in particular, that “California would not be the place” where 
marriage litigation was launched.41 By far the most important factor mili-
tating against litigation was the ease with which California’s constitution 
could be amended to erase any gain won through the courts. The key ques-
tion, according to one Lambda lawyer, was this: “If we were to win in the 
[California] supreme court, what would we need to do to hold on to it?”42
The answer was clear: Marriage equality supporters would have to be able 
to mobilize enough voters to thwart the initiative to bar same-sex couples 
from marriage that would surely come. This, they decided, they could not 
yet do. 
Early on, the movement lawyers were relatively successful in dissuad-
ing other lawyers from litigating what they viewed as ill-advised marriage 
cases. As the co-director of the ACLU LGBT Project, put it, “[We] spent a 
lot of time talking people down from that particular ledge.”43 Movement 
lawyers did not simply assert, but rather they persuaded with argument and 
evidence. Indeed, they could not simply assert, since—as the case of 
George Vaughn and Shelly v. Kraemer forty years earlier revealed—the 
openness of the legal system to challengers meant that remonstration was 
the only way to stop ill-advised lawsuits from being filed. 
In general, movement lawyers succeeded in talking down others in the 
LGBT rights field from filing suits. In the face of interest among some 
junior lawyers in filing a federal challenge in California, movement law-
yers deftly convened a 2003 meeting at the UCLA School of Law to debate 
the merits of an affirmative marriage challenge. The meeting was attended 
by all of the major LGBT rights lawyers and leading legal academics 
whose work touched on LGBT themes. Lambda’s legal director circulated 
a persuasive memo on the ballot initiative process in California, which 
warned that “failure to consider [whether an anti-marriage initiative could 
be defeated at the polls] could make affirmative marriage litigation not only 
futile, but . . . set back future attempts to obtain both judicial and legislative 
reform to the marriage laws.”44 Marriage litigation was again deferred. As 
 40.  478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
 41.  Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1255 (quoting Jennifer Pizer, Director, Marriage 
Project, Lambda Legal). 
 42.  Id.
 43.  Id. at 1298 (quoting James Esseks, Co-Director, ACLU LGBT Rights Project). 
 44.  Memorandum on Amendment of the California Constitution from Jon W. Davidson, Legal 
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another Lambda lawyer put it: “Smart people had thought about it. We had 
a plan.”45
Yet ultimately, movement lawyers could not implement that plan in 
the face of dissenters outside of movement leadership. In early 2004, newly 
elected San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom decided to start issuing mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples—dismayed by President George Bush’s 
State of the Union speech vowing to “protect” marriage from “activist 
judges” and emboldened by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
decision in Goodridge affirming the right of same-sex couples to marry.46
Despite warnings from movement lawyers, who “‘initially tried to talk 
[him] out of it,” Newsom proceeded with his plan, which was immediately 
challenged in court by Christian Right legal groups.47 For the lawyers who 
had labored so carefully to control the timing and nature of any marriage 
challenge, the Newsom decision immediately transformed the political 
landscape. Overnight, as Lambda’s Jenny Pizer recalled, the question for 
the lawyers became: “What part of our strategy can we salvage?”48
Mayor Newsom’s decision to issue marriage licenses provoked legal 
challenges that ultimately led to a favorable California Supreme Court de-
cision—which, as movement lawyers had predicted, was swiftly reversed 
by Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to prohibit 
same-sex marriage. 
After a state suit to challenge Proposition 8 failed, a federal lawsuit 
was announced—not by movement lawyers, but by legal elites and ideolog-
ical opposites: Ted Olson, who represented George W. Bush in the 2000 
recount and then served as his solicitor general, and David Boies, a promi-
nent trial lawyer who represented Al Gore in the 2000 election recount. The 
case was orchestrated by Los Angeles political strategist Chad Griffin, who 
had worked on Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign and then ran a 
foundation for Rob Reiner.49 A mutual friend put Olson in touch with Grif-
fin, who selected the plaintiffs and set up the American Foundation for 
Equal Rights to fund the litigation. Olson’s firm, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, 
agreed to take the case on a hybrid-fee arrangement in which it would do-
Counsel, Lambda Legal, for California Marriage Litigation Roundtable (Dec. 16, 2002) (on file with 
author).
 45.  Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1271 (quoting Jennifer Pizer, Director, Marriage 
Project, Lambda Legal). 
 46.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003). 
 47.  Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1277 (quoting Shannon Minter, Legal Director, 
National Center for Lesbian Rights). 
 48.  Id. at 1281 (quoting Jennifer Pizer, Director, Marriage Project, Lambda Legal). 
 49.  See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER (Jan. 18, 
2010),http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa_fact_talbot. 
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nate the first $100,000 worth of services and then collect “flat fees for the 
various phases,” ultimately amounting to millions of dollars.50 Olson then 
brought in Boies. 
Movement lawyers tried to manage this dramatic display of dissent. 
LGBT rights lawyers issued a joint statement called “Why the Ballot Box 
and Not the Courts Should Be the Next Step on Marriage in California,” 
arguing that “we need to go back to the voters.”51 This did not deter Olson 
and Boies. So, in May 2009, Lambda Legal and ACLU lawyers met to 
dissuade Olson and his colleagues from filing a federal challenge—but to 
no avail. Olson decided to proceed with the lawsuit, then titled Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, and movement lawyers were confronted with a stark de-
cision about how to respond to the federal suit they had fought for so long 
to prevent.52
Their initial strategy was to cooperate with Olson and Boies, but not to 
intervene or file a parallel suit. They asked themselves: “Would our partic-
ipation make a difference?”53 Based on their assessment of the risks of the 
lawsuit, coupled with their respect for the litigation skills of Olson and 
Boies, they determined that the answer was no. Instead, they decided to 
play an amicus role. This posture changed when district court judge 
Vaughn Walker called for evidence that it seemed that Olson and Boies 
were not prepared to offer, yet the district court ultimately rejected the 
movement lawyers’ motion to intervene, though it permitted intervention 
by a close ally, the City Attorney of San Francisco (since the city had an 
interest in legal enforcement).54 The movement lawyers thus worked close-
ly with the city to build the evidentiary case for discrimination at the trial 
court level. And in their amicus capacity, the movement lawyers in their 
Perry amicus brief sought to emphasize “the singular nature of the case 
 50.  Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW. Jan. 2010, available 
at http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=906575.
 51.  ACLU ET AL., WHY THE BALLOT BOX AND NOT THE COURTS SHOULD BE THE NEXT
STEP ON MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/ballot_box_
20090527.pdf. 
 52.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger ultimately became known as Hollingsworth v. Perry.133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). 
 53.  Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1300 (quoting Jennifer Pizer, Director, Marriage 
Project, Lambda Legal). 
 54.  See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiffs; Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009); Bob Egelko, 
Judge Sets January Trial for Prop. 8 Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Judge-sets-January-trial-for-Prop-8-lawsuit-3220955.php. 
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presented by Proposition 8, and the California-focused analysis that accord-
ingly is warranted.”55
By asking the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs on narrow state-
specific grounds, the lawyers sought to frame the issues in a way that had 
the greatest chance of being upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on review. 
Their strategy seemed to work: After trial, Judge Walker struck down 
Proposition 8 on due process and equal protection grounds in an opinion 
that emphasized the unique nature of the California case.56 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, in affirming, emphasized the specific context of California, where 
Proposition 8 had withdrawn marital recognition after it had already pro-
vided all of the rights and privileges of marriage through domestic partner-
ship (and then through a state Supreme Court ruling)—a move that could 
only be explained, in the court’s view, by animus.57 The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled even more narrowly, rejecting marriage opponents’ appeal on 
standing grounds, but effectively permitting same-sex marriage in Califor-
nia under the “one-state-solution”—and thus achieving the hard-fought 
movement goal.58
In the end, this case can be viewed as an illustration of the constant 
and often productive role dissent can play in a top-down legal campaign to 
establish rights in the contemporary political environment. Instead of mus-
cling a case through courts over dissent, movement lawyers in the Califor-
nia same-sex marriage campaign muscled through important non-marital 
recognition legislation in collaboration with political allies, and helped to 
reshape a legal challenge they did not think wise into a movement victo-
ry—partial as it may be. Battles with movement allies and opponents lim-
ited the LGBT rights lawyers’ ability to set the agenda by forcing them to 
defend the rights of same-sex couples against legal attack. In this way, 
movement lawyers were enlisted in legal fights not of their choosing. Ne-
gotiations with outside lawyers to stop (or reshape) rival litigation efforts 
forced them to continuously reassess their no-litigation position and ask 
themselves whether the time was finally ripe for a marriage challenge. 
These forces contributed to a decision-making context in which the lawyers 
were constantly pushed to be accountable to the broader LGBT communi-
ty—which of course throughout remained divided. 
 55.  Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Inc., and National Center for Lesbian Rights at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009). 
 56.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 57.  Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 58.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). 
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B. Law Reform from the Bottom-Up: The Anti-Big-Box Campaign 
What I have suggested so far, then, is that top-down public interest 
lawyering may sometimes productively engage intragroup dissent and ul-
timately produce outcomes that are informed by vigorous intra-movement 
debate over means and ends. What about bottom-up lawyering, which is 
often suggested as more accountable to broad community interests? 
To address this question, I again look close to home to the emergence 
of the so-called “accountable development” movement in Los Angeles, in 
which community-labor coalitions have sought to change city redevelop-
ment practices through grassroots campaigns. These campaigns are aimed 
at increasing community participation in the planning process and forcing 
local developers and governmental officials to commit to redevelopment 
projects that are responsive to the needs of low-income residents. In these 
campaigns, as Jennifer Gordon has aptly noted, “the lawyer is not the pro-
tagonist.”59 Instead, the lawyer is enlisted to represent a coalition of organ-
izations in situations in which grassroots organizing and community-
building have already occurred and objectives have been defined. How do 
these kinds of projects engage intragroup dissent? 
To explore this issue, I want to set a different sort of stage, drawing 
upon research for a book I am doing on the role of lawyers in the L.A. la-
bor movement, part of which focuses on the campaign to block Walmart 
from opening a Supercenter in Inglewood, California—a separately incor-
porated, and historically middle class African American city, in Los Ange-
les county. That campaign was developed and led by the Los Angeles 
Alliance for a New Economy (also known as LAANE), a community or-
ganization formed in 1993 by the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Union 
Local 11 to move beyond conventional union organizing to more effective-
ly address the growth of low-wage work in LA.60 The group, which was 
financially supported by labor unions and philanthropic sources, scored its 
first major success spearheading the enactment of the Los Angeles living 
wage law in 1997.61 It was directed by a public interest lawyer with sub-
stantial advocacy and policy experience, and staffed by researchers and 
organizers who developed what they called “comprehensive campaigns”—
which combined organizing, policy advocacy, research, communications, 
 59.  Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and 
Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133 (2007). 
 60.  For more information on LAANE, see my previous writing in Scott L. Cummings, Law in the 
Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 
1945-51 (2007). 
 61.  See L.A. ADMIN. CODE art. 11 (2007). 
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fundraising, and legal advocacy—to advance local policy reforms to im-
prove conditions in geographically stable low-wage sectors, such as the 
hospitality, transportation, and grocery industries. 
Beginning in 2003, LAANE collaborated with the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) Local 770 to stop the development 
of what would have been the first Walmart Supercenter in metropolitan Los 
Angeles.62 This “site fight” campaign was advanced by the Coalition for a 
Better Inglewood, an alliance of groups organized by LAANE (which 
played the key leadership role in the coalition) that included the UFCW and 
ACORN, in addition to several other community-based and progressive 
faith-based groups.63 The campaign was framed by the threat that 
Walmart’s Supercenter format—which housed a nonunionized grocery 
department—posed to the unionized grocery sector in Southern California, 
which Walmart was targeting for expansion. Inglewood was the line in the 
sand drawn by the UCFW and its allies, which believed that Walmart’s 
entry into the Los Angeles area would weaken union bargaining power in 
negotiating with local grocery chains (that could invoke Supercenter com-
petition as a reason to cut wages and benefits). To defend Inglewood 
against Walmart’s entry, the coalition deployed a strategy that combined 
grassroots organizing and litigation to mobilize Inglewood voters to defeat 
a Walmart-sponsored ballot initiative, which was called “Measure 04-A,” 
64 which would have circumvented the normal environmental and land use 
review process to automatically authorize the proposed Supercenter—
taking the decision away from a city council that was in fact hostile to the 
development.65
I want to focus on the lawyering role, which was to advance objectives 
clearly set by the coalition: to thwart the initiative and block the Walmart 
store. To do so, the UFCW and LAANE jointly retained an environmental 
and land use lawyer, whose practice background was deemed critical to 
challenging an initiative that sought to circumvent conventional environ-
mental and land use processes. This lawyer ran a small private public inter-
est law firm that championed progressive causes, and in this case formally 
represented both LAANE and the coalition, although client communica-
tions were generally with LAANE representatives, and LAANE paid for 
the legal work on a reduced-fee basis. The coalition also assembled a larger 
 62.  See Cummings, supra note 60, at 1951. 
 63.  See TRACY GRAY-BARKAN, WAL-MART AND BEYOND: THE BATTLE FOR GOOD JOBS AND 
STRONG COMMUNITIES IN URBAN AMERICA vii (2007). 
 64.  See Initiative Measure to Be Submitted to the Voters, Proposed Inglewood, Cal., Initiative 
Measure 04-A, available at http://www.cityofinglewood.org/pdfs/Home%20Page/doc.pdf.
 65.  For more information on this mobilization, see Cummings, supra note 60, at 1951-78. 
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team of lawyers to consult on the case. This team consisted of a well-
known labor lawyer and a partner in a small commercial litigation firm, 
who was a land use specialist and joined the Inglewood team as pro bono 
counsel to LAANE. It also included Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, who is now 
dean of the law school at UC Irvine.66
A key question faced by the legal team at the outset was whether to 
file a pre-election challenge to block the initiative or to wait until after the 
election to sue in the event that Measure 04-A passed. Though the lawyers 
were confident about winning a post-election challenge, they were “less 
sanguine about the prospects of prevailing on pre-election review, given the 
strong judicial bias against preempting the electoral process absent a clear 
showing of an initiative’s invalidity.”67 Nonetheless, the legal team agreed 
to pursue a pre-election challenge to block the initiative based on two con-
siderations. First, the team, in consultation with LAANE organizers, agreed 
that they should take advantage of the outside chance to succeed on the 
merits to halt the initiative. In fact, LAANE was concerned about its ability 
to win the ballot initiative outright and thus viewed litigation as perhaps its 
best chance of gaining victory in Inglewood. Second, LAANE believed that 
even if the pre-election lawsuit proved unsuccessful, it would still put 
Walmart on notice that, if it won the ballot initiative, it would face a strong 
legal challenge that would at the very least tie up the plan in court. In addi-
tion, even if the lawsuit did not stop the ballot initiative, the coalition be-
lieved that the publicity it created would amplify its central argument: that 
Walmart was attempting to place itself “above the law.” 
The court, in what came as no surprise, rejected the pre-election chal-
lenge, holding that “the petitioners had not made a ‘clear/compelling show-
ing of invalidity’ that would warrant interfering with ‘the people’s 
constitutional right of initiative.’”68 The legal team then turned to prepare 
for a post-election lawsuit to invalidate Measure 04-A if it passed. In the 
end, however, the success of the grassroots campaign rendered a post-
election lawsuit moot as Inglewood voters sent Measure 04-A to defeat by 
a decisive margin.69 It was Walmart’s first ballot-box defeat and an embar-
rassing setback in the company’s Southern California expansion plans, 
 66.  For more information on this litigation team, see id. at 1964-67. 
 67.  Id. at 1967. The views of LAANE and their lawyers, which I discuss on this page and the 
following few pages, were expressed to me through a series of interviews. I documented these inter-
views in my previous article. See id. at 1951-78. 
 68.  Id. at 1968-69 (quoting Tentative Decision, Coalition for a Better Inglewood v. City of Ingle-
wood, No. BS087433 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2004)). 
 69.  See Sara Lin & Monte Morin, Voters in Inglewood Turn Away Wal-Mart, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/07/local/me-walmart7.
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particularly in light of the fact that Walmart had spent over $1 million to 
secure the initiative’s passage. 
The momentum from the campaign carried over to the enactment of 
innovative citywide Superstore Ordinances—first in Los Angeles, then in 
Inglewood—that made any future effort by Walmart to open a Supercenter 
more difficult.70 The labor lawyer working with UFCW and LAANE on 
the Inglewood challenge drafted this law. Despite early hostility, Walmart 
eventually accepted the ordinance once it became clear that it had the 
overwhelming support of the city council. In August 2004, after roughly 
three months of negotiations, Los Angeles passed the nation’s first Super-
stores Ordinance, which requires an economic impact analysis demonstrat-
ing the absence of adverse economic impacts prior to big-box approval.71 A 
similar ordinance, also drafted by LAANE’s lawyer, was enacted in Ingle-
wood two years later.72
With that context, let me focus on the issue of intragroup dissent with 
the coalition and how it was managed—or not—by the lawyers involved. 
In this bottom-up context, key features of the campaign were: (1) the pres-
ence of organizationally complex clients, allied in a coalition, with relative-
ly stronger and weaker members; (2) the assembly of legal teams based on 
expertise, but not (necessarily) long-term commitment to an overarching 
(in this case, anti-Walmart) cause; and (3) the clients’ formulation and exe-
cution of a discrete policy objective targeted at the local policy arena. As 
the case study suggests, this structure mitigates the problem of lawyer dom-
ination of clients, but potentially aggravates the problem of the more pow-
erful and vocal client constituency (here, organized labor) 
disproportionately influencing the agenda setting and tactical aspects of the 
campaign. 
On the client end, LAANE was a relatively powerful community or-
ganization, drawing political clout and resources from its labor affiliation, 
and governed by politically savvy and influential leaders. The strength and 
coherence of LAANE’s leadership structure tended to insulate it from un-
due influence from outside lawyers. Because LAANE approached the law-
yers as empowered political actors, the lawyering itself focused on 
achieving a result defined by the coalition rather than on promoting goals 
envisioned by the lawyers who represented them. 
 70.  See L.A. MUN. CODE § 12.24(U)(14) (2004); Josh Grossberg, Inglewood Law Scrutinizes 
Superstores, DAILY BREEZE (July 13, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20060716062
612/http://www.dailybreeze.com/news/articles/3342321.html (discussing the Inglewood ordinance).  
 71.  L.A. MUN. CODE § 12.24(U)(14). 
 72.  Grossberg, supra note 70. 
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For their part, the lawyers who worked on the campaign approached 
their engagement with LAANE and the broader coalition from a perspec-
tive that mitigated concerns about client domination. For one, they were 
generally private sector lawyers retained by the clients to achieve a well-
specified result. Their role conception, informed by their position in the 
market, was quite conventional. David Pettit, the small firm lawyer retained 
by LAANE to be part of the legal team, adopted what he termed the “David 
Binder method” of client representation,73 referring to his UCLA Law 
School professor and one of the founders of clinical legal education—
famous for his seminal text in client counseling that advocates a “client-
centered” approach designed to protect client autonomy in all aspects of 
representation.74 Thus, Pettit approached his ongoing relationship with 
LAANE from a very deferential counseling perspective, talking to its rep-
resentatives about their short- and long-term objectives and basing his ap-
proach in any particular campaign on their articulated goals. 
The conventional nature of the lawyer-client relationship, however, 
raised its own questions about how much dissenting voices were engaged 
in the campaign. Even within the confines of the lawyer-client relationship 
as constructed by the parties, the potential for conflicts was ripe. On the 
one hand, the coalition included representatives from LAANE and the 
UFCW, who brought critical financial and organizational resources; on the 
other, the coalition contained more loosely constituted resident and faith-
based groups that lent credibility and authenticity, but did not have the 
same decision-making clout. This created inherent questions of governance 
and authority to make decisions on behalf of the entire coalition—made 
more difficult by the fact that LAANE was also named as a separate party 
to the litigation and was paying for the legal representation. In one example 
of how this played out, civil rights groups, including the NAACP and Ur-
ban League, broke ranks with labor to support Walmart on the ground that 
the Inglewood community had for so long been deprived of access to a 
local grocery store—and the jobs that went with it.75
As this suggests, the existence of multiple attorneys representing rela-
tively powerful client groups may have mitigated the potential for client 
domination, but it also underscored the possible divisions between those 
 73.  Cummings, supra note 60, at 1993 (quoting David Pettit). 
 74.  See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 3 
(2d ed. 2004); Cummings, supra note 60, at 1993-94.
 75.  See GRAY-BARKAN, supra note 63, at viii (describing a similar wedge dynamic in various 
anti-Wal-Mart campaigns across the country); Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Inglewood Opens the Wal-Mart 
Wars, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/08/opinion/oe-hutchinson8 
(discussing Wal-Mart’s outreach to the NAACP).
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clients and the broader “community” represented by the coalition, suggest-
ing how difficult it is for public interest lawyers to be accountable to the 
community at large, rather than a particular interest group within it. Indeed, 
an important division revealed in the anti-Walmart campaign was between 
class- and race-based conceptions of community. In Inglewood, Walmart 
was able to drive a wedge between the labor-backed CBI and traditional 
African American groups, like the Urban League and NAACP, which sup-
ported the Supercenter development. As a result, coalition lawyers could 
not claim to represent an entire working-class community of color in its 
fight against Walmart—but rather simply one faction within it. In this way, 
the lawyers could be viewed as choosing sides in an intra-community dis-
pute in a similar fashion to the LDF desegregation lawyers criticized by 
Derrick Bell.76
One crucial difference is that in this type of bottom-up campaign, it is 
the power of non-legal client groups—such as LAANE—that drives the 
policy choice, rather than the lawyers themselves. But this also highlights 
the central trade-off of the bottom-up model: As client groups take the lead 
in shaping and executing the policy objective, the more powerful among 
them wield disproportionate influence in the process of defining what con-
stitutes the authentic “community” interest. The lawyers then facilitate the 
groups’ exercise of power. In this sense, bottom-up strategies do not avoid 
accountability problems, but rather transfer the central locus of conflict 
from the relationship between lawyers and clients to that between clients 
and the broader communities they purport to represent. 
CONCLUSION
In the end, I offer these cases to you in the spirit of intragroup dis-
sent—not to suggest that top-down is better than bottom-up, but to dissent 
against the view that the reverse is necessarily true. What I think both cases 
demonstrate is that social change is difficult and complex, and that to 
achieve it, some dissent must give way, whether to lawyer initiative or 
community power. What I want to leave you with is the idea that what we 
should ultimately care about are the multiple and context specific ways that 
dissent is aired and respected in social movement environments. Lawyers, 
for reasons of professional role, and litigation, for reasons of technical ad-
judication, may do a better or worse job in managing dissent, but in judging 
their effectiveness we should always ask: as compared to what? That is, we 
 76.  See generally Bell, supra note 4. 
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should not presume that lawyers will be structurally worse managing dis-
sent than non-lawyer movement leaders. 
What these studies show is that, in both top-down and bottom-up law-
yering contexts, whether client interests are served (and whether we should 
care if they are) depends on factors such as the degree and power of client 
organizations, whether clients pay fees (and how much), the extent to 
which multiple clients and client groups are involved (and how they inter-
act), and the nature and scope of the policy reforms at stake. Yet, if we 
ultimately care about lawyers advancing policy claims that actually reflect 
the interests of the communities they purport to serve, the approach de-
scribed in both cases—so far as they suggest that advocacy embedded in 
politics deepens community ties—may be a step in the right direction, even 
though it is imperfect—as everything is. In this sense, I hope that they are 
not only stories of the challenges lawyers confront managing dissent in the 
post-civil rights political context, but also stories that guide the way toward 
deeper engagement with dissent that advances democratic social change. 
